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CASENOTES

CLIFFORD-JACOBSFORGING COMPANY v.
CAPITAL ENGINEERING &
MANUFACTURING CO. :*
THE CONTINUING
PROBLEM WITHIN U.C.C. SECTION 2-207
Although the "battle of the forms"' was not a major historical military conflict, it has proven to be a major conflict between
contracting parties. 2 To provide a resolution to the battle of the
forms, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code created
* 107 Ill. App. 3d 29, 437 N.E.2d 22 (1982).
1. The "battle of the forms" is a problem which arises under the common-law mirror-image rule of contract law. The mirror image doctrine requires a valid acceptance to match the offer in every detail. The battle
begins thusly: offeror drafts an offer, a confirmatory memorandum of a
prior oral agreement, which contains terms to his advantage and sends it to
the offeree. The offeree drafts an acceptance, or his confirmatory memorandum of the oral agreement, which contains terms to his advantage. This
acceptance, or either of the confirmatory memoranda, may contain some
extra terms not discussed by the parties. Usually no problems are encountered until a dispute arises, and each party pulls out its form to examine the
terms. The parties then discover that their forms do not exactly match.
Under the mirror-image rule, the parties are left without a contract because
the two writings do not match, even though one or both parties may have
begun to perform. The battle then erupts over which contract and which
terms wU govern performance. See generally J. Wm'r & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-2 (2d ed.
1980); Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAw. 789 (1969).
2. For general discussions of the battle of the forms, see Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 171 (1975); Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of
Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAw. 75 (1963) (disappointed expectations and frustrated
intentions of businessmen in commercial transactions); Kove, "The Battle of
the Forms": A Proposalto Revise Section 2-207, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 7 (1970) (analysis of confusion added by § 2-207); Murray, Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts, 37
FoRDHAm L. REV. 317 (1969) (common law allowed party to escape undesirable bargain through loophole created by mirror-image rule); Note, All
Quiet on the 2-207 Front?,35 U. Prrr. L REV. 685 (1974) (battle of the forms
is an absurdity and an exercise in futility) (hereinafter cited as All Quiet];
Comment, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code-New Rules for
the "Battleof the Forms", 32 U. PrrT. L.REV. 209 (1971) (characterizing precode law as harsh and mechanical).
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section 2-207. 3 This provision allows parties intending to form a
contract to enforce their agreement despite the presence of additional 4 or different5 terms in the acceptance form. 6 The statute provides that a contract is formed and the extra terms are
considered proposed modifications to the contract. If the parties
are merchants,7 additional, but not different, terms will become
part of the contract, unless the terms are timely objected to by
the offeror, or will materially alter the contract. 8 In Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Engineering& Manufacturing Co. ,9
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District addressed
the question of whether a price-adjustment provision included
in a standard acceptance form could be considered part of an
agreement between merchants even though the term seemed to
differ from the terms of the offer. 10 The court applied Illinois'
section 2-207 and held that the price-adjustment provision was
an addition to the offer and part of the contract because it did
not materially alter the agreement. 1
On March 5, 1979, the defendant, Capital Engineering, sent a
purchase order to the plaintiff, Clifford-Jacobs, offering to buy a
large quantity of forged parts.12 In addition to containing an estimate of the price, quantity, and delivery date, the purchase or3. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978) (Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-207 (1981). Illinois adopted U.C.C. § 2-207
verbatim. In the text of this casenote, section 2-207 refers to the Illinois

statute, U.C.C. § 2-207, and the other states' statutes which have been
modeled on U.C.C. § 2-207. Louisiana is the only state which has not

adopted § 2-207.
4. The U.C.C. does not define what additional is. It is commonly defined as something existing or coming by way of addition or added further.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 24 (1981).

5. The U.C.C. does not define what different is. It is commonly defined
as partly or totally unlike in nature, form, or quality; distinct, separate, or
contrasting. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED

630 (1981).

6. See, e.g., Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter., 39 Ill. App. 3d

48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976) (general policy of § 2-207 is that the parties should
be able to enforce their agreements).
7. A merchant is a person who holds himself out as having a special
knowledge or skill in the transaction undertaken; he is held to a higher
standard of care in commercial transactions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-

104(1) (1981). "Between merchants" means any transaction where both

parties are considered merchants in that particular transaction. Id. at § 2-

104(3).
8. Id. at § 2-207(2). See supra note 3.

9. 107 Ill. App. 3d 29, 437 N.E.2d 22 (1982).
10. Id. at 30, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
11. Id. at 32-33, 437 N.E.2d at 24-25.

12. Id. at 30, 437 N.E.2d at 22-23. The parts were to be used in a defense
contract awarded to Capital by the federal government. Capital claimed

that because a fixed-price federal contract was involved, Clifford-Jacobs
was aware of Capital's need to have a fixed price set in the contract. Brief
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der also included a provision limiting the cost of the forged parts
to the estimates contained in the order. 13 It further provided
that if the prices should be higher than the estimate, Capital
was to be notified prior to shipment. 14 The plaintiff received the
defendant's purchase order and on March 22, 1979, returned its
standard acceptance form which stated the terms of the agreement.15 This standard acceptance included a price-adjustment
provision allowing Clifford-Jacobs to adjust the price according
to changes in its production and shipping costs any time prior to
shipment, 16 but requiring Clifford-Jacobs to allow Capital an opportunity to cancel its order if the price adjustment was
17
unsatisfactory.
In September, one month prior to the final shipment, the
plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant informing it of a general
7.2% price increase effective October 15, 1979.18 Capital did not
object and accepted delivery. A disagreement subsequently
arose over the cost of the final shipment. 19 Clifford-Jacobs filed
a complaint in the Circuit Court of Champaign County alleging
breach of contract and asked for damages and interest for the
amount owed under the contract. 20 Capital tendered the
amount due prior to the price increase and contended that the
increase was not part of the contract under section 2-207.21 The
for Appellant at 4, Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co.,
107 1l. App. 3d 29, 437 N.E.2d 22 (1982).

13. The provision in Capital's purchase order stated: "If Seller's prices
are higher than herein specified, Buyer must be so advised before shipment. If no prices are specified, goods will be billed at not more than the
prices last quoted to or paid by Buyer, or at the prevailing market price,
App. 3d at 30, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
whichever is lower." 107 Ill.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. The provision in Clifford-Jacobs' acceptance form stated:
Prices stated herein are based on current labor, material, and overhead
costs and, if any changes occur in such costs at any time prior to shipment, prices may be adjusted by the seller to reflect such cost changes.
If such adjustments are not mutually satisfactory, either party may cancel on terms set forth in paragraph 10.
Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. The letter dated September 12, 1979, stated in part:
Our last general price adjustment for labor and overhead cost increases
was effective October 16, 1978. Substantial cost increases since that
time have been incurred and absorbed by us. In order to partially re-

cover these labor and overhead cost increases, our selling prices for
forging shipped on and after October 15, 1979 will be increased by 7.2%.
Brief for Appellee at 3, Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg.
Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 29, 437 N.E.2d 22 (1982).
App. 3d at 30, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
19. 107 Ill.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 30-31, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
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trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.22 The lower court concluded that the acceptance was conditional upon Capital's assent to the different terms and that
Capital did so when it accepted the initial delivery. 23 It further
did
concluded that Clifford-Jacob's price-adjustment provision
24
not conflict with Capital's terms in the purchase order.
On appeal, the appellate court unanimously affirmed the
trial court's order.25 The issue before the court was whether the
price-adjustment provision included in the standard acceptance
form was part of the contract formed by the exchange of documents. 26 The appellate court found that Clifford-Jacobs' reply
was not made expressly conditional on Capital's assent to any
additional terms; the reply therefore operated as an acceptance
and not as a counteroffer. 27 The court concluded that the controversial term was additional to and not different from Capital's
offer. 28 It then determined as a matter of law that the additional
term did not create an unreasonable surprise for Capital, and
thus the price-adjustment provision did not materially alter the
contract. 29 The court stated that no question of fact existed and
22. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg. Co., No. 80-L-16
(Cir. Ct. Ill. ified August 10, 1981). The trial court granted summary judgment under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (1981).
23. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg. Co., No. 80-L-16 at

3.
24. Id.
25. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App.
3d 29, 34, 437 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1982).
26. Id. at 30-31, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
27. Id. at 31, 437 N.E.2d at 24. Although the court did not address the
trial court's application of § 2-207, its reasoning contradicts the lower court's
analysis. The trial court believed that the last clause of § 2-207(1) controlled
Clifford-Jacobs' acceptance and that the acceptance was actually a counteroffer. The judge interpreted the reply sent by Clifford-Jacobs to be expressly conditional on Capital's assent to the additional terms. The lower
court further held that Capital had assented to the terms by accepting the
shipments. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., No. 80-L16 (Cir. Ct. Ill. filed August 10, 1981) at 1-3. The trial court's approach follows the interpretation of § 2-207 in Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297
F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962). Roto-Lith stated that any condition materially altering another party's obligation to the sole advantage of the party introducing
the provision was expressly conditional and prevented a responding document from operating as an acceptance. This interpretation has been overruled in most jurisdictions and highly criticized by commentators. The
reason put forth for the criticism is that the analysis incorporates the common-law mirror-image doctrine into § 2-207. See generally J. WiurrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 1-2, at 28-29. Cf. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977) (following RotoLith; term in acceptance to disadvantage of offeror operates as
counteroffer).
28. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 1l1. App.
3d 29, 32, 437 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1982).
29. Id. at 33, 437 N.E.2d at 24.

19831

Clifford-Jacobs Forging v. Capital Eng. & Mfg.

upheld the summary judgment. 30
The appellate court reasoned in syllogistic form to reach its
conclusion that the extra term was additional rather than different.31 Without relying on precedent, the court decided that additional terms do not conflict while different terms do.3 2 The
court then compared both documents and noted that each party
had included a provision referring to higher prices. 33 Capital's
provision required notice of any price increase prior to shipment. Clifford-Jacobs' provision allowed price adjustments reflecting any change in production and delivery costs any time
prior to shipment. The only limitation on Clifford-Jacobs' term
was that either party could cancel if not satisfied with any price
adjustment. 34 The court also stated that because neither form
prohibited an increase in the manner the plaintiff had attempted
to use, the terms did not conflict. The appellate court then concluded that, because of the lack of conflict between the two
35
terms, the term in the plaintiff's acceptance was additional.
The court relied on the official comments to section 2-207 for
its determination that the additional price-adjustment provision
36
did not materially alter the agreement between the parties.
The comments suggest that an additional term would be a material alteration only if its inclusion in a contract would change the
bargain resulting "in surprise or hardship" to an unsuspecting
party.3 7 The court noted that Capital had received notice of the
30. Id. at 34, 437 N.E.2d at 25. Capital argued that summary judgment
was improper under the circumstances of this case. It contended that the

determination of a material alteration presented a genuine question of fact
which could only be resolved by a trial. Brief for Appellant at 8-9, CliffordJacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 29, 437 N.E.2d
22 (1982). After an examination of the Illinois summary judgment statute,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (1981), the court concluded that whether there

had been a material alteration was a question of construction of the lanauage of the parties. The court relied on Bates v. Select Lake City Theater
erating Co., 78 1I. App. 3d 153, 397 N.E.2d 75 (1979), where it was held that

construction of the language of a contract is a question for the court. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33, 437
N.E.2d 22, 25 (1982).
31. 107

m.

App. 3d at 31-32, 437 N.E.2d at 24.

Id. at 32, 437 N.E.2d at 24.
Id.
Id. at 30, 437 N.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 32, 437 N.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 32-33, 437 N.E.2d at 24-25.
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-207, UNoIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE comments
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

3, 4 (Smith-Hurd 1963). The court also examined comments 4 and 5 for ex-

amples of materially-altering terms. Comment 4 lists typical clauses which
normally are considered to materially alter an offer. Such clauses tend to
increase the burden on and limit the rights of an offeror. Comment 5 lists
typical clauses which are not material alterations of the offer. These
clauses deal with controls on the performance of the contract rather than on
the rights of the offeror. Id. at comments 4 &5.
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inciease prior to the final shipment, referred to the lack of conflict between the terms, and then ruled, as a matter of law, that
no unreasonable surprise could have occurred. 38 The court concluded that inclusion of the price-adjustment provision would be
39
consistent with the purpose of section 2-207.
The purpose of Illinois' section 2-207 is to prevent application of the inflexible common-law mirror-image rule.4° Theoretically, section 2-207 allows parties to enforce their intended
agreements regardless of the inclusion of additional terms in the
acceptance. 41 Notwithstanding the drafters' intentions, 42 the

statute has fallen prey to a variety of interpretations and inconsistent applications. 43 As a result, courts and commentators
have criticized section 2-207 for its inability to provide for the
satisfactory achievement of its purpose." Most refer to the
problems caused by the exclusion of the phrase "different from"
from subsection 2.45 Confusion arises over what "additional
38. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App.
3d 29, 33, 437 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1982).
39. Id. See generally Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980) (general purpose of § 2-207 is to allow
parties to enforce their agreement).
40. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter., 39 Il.App. 3d 48, 55,
349 N.E.2d 627, 634 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d
338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980); Tecumseh Int'l Corp. v. City of Springfield, 70 IMI.
App. 3d 101, 388 N.E.2d 460 (1979); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip.
Enter., 39 Ill.
App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976). See also infra note 59.
42. See generally Weeks, "Battle of the Forms" under the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 ILL. B.J. 660 (1964) (technical rules should not prevent parties from fulfilling their contract expectations; § 2-207 allows for such
fulfillment); All Quiet, supra note 2, at 689-90 (§ 2-207 eliminates potential
injustice of common-law mirror-image doctrine).
43. Compare Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1962) (responding document which included a materially-altering term to
the disadvantage of the offeror was not an acceptance, but operated as a
counteroffer) and Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977) (acknowledgement to offer which contained
terms which would materially alter offer was not acceptance but counteroffer) with Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972)
(acceptance under § 2-207 will operate as a counteroffer only when reply
was made expressly conditional on assent by offeror to additional terms).
44. Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) ("a prolific source of controversy"). Accord Southwest Eng'g Co.
v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18, 25 (1970) (§ 2-207 is a "murky
bit of prose"); J. WarrE &R. SUMMERS,supra note 1, at § 1-2, at 25-26 (§ 2-207
is "like the amphibious tank ... designed to fight in the swamps, but...
sent to fight in the desert" and has further trouble because the terrain is
varied).
45. Subsection 1 covers terms "additional to or different from," while
subsection 2 only mentions "additional terms." See also 1 A. SQUILLANTE &
J. FONSECA, WILLSTON ON SALES § 7-5, at 291 (1973) (noting problem which
arises when drafters' intentions as to what they intended "additional" to
cover are explored); G. WALLACH, THE LAw OF SALEs UNDER THE UNIFORM
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terms" cover and what happens to "different terms."' '
Clifford-Jacobspresented an Illinois appellate court with an
opportunity to clarify the discrepancies between subsections 1
and 2 of section 2-207 and to declare what distinction should be
made between different and additional terms in Illinois. Although the court reached the proper result, it did not confront
the inconsistencies of subsections 1 and 2, and it avoided the inconsistencies by solving the question without fully explaining
its choice of definitions. An analysis of related judicial decisions
and scholarly commentary provides insight into the court's underlying rationale.
Courts and commentators tend to take two separate approaches to the discrepancies in section 2-207.47 One approach
stresses a strict adherence to the language of the statute. 48 This
strict approach defines additional terms as those pertaining to
something not included in the offer.49 By definition, a different
term conflicts with or contradicts the terms of an offer and consequently cannot be considered a contract provision. 50 The rationale behind this approach is that an offeror should not be
subject to terms for which he did not bargain. 5 ' Different terms
are excluded automatically because an offeror, as master of his
offer, would object to them, 52 and because conflicting terms
3.04(1), at 3-10 (1981) (§ 2-207 leaves the term "different
from" undefined and courts have yet to resolve this issue).
COMMERCIAL CODE

46. Duesenberg, General Provisions,Sales, Bulk Transfers and Docu-

ments of Title, 29 Bus. LAw. 1243, 1248 (1974) (because § 2-207 is silent on
what happens to different terms, major problem arises in deciding what
term is different and what term is additional).
47. Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (court identifies two general interpretations of different versus
additional terms problem).
48. American Parts Co. v. American Arbit. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967) (only additional terms and not different terms could become part of a contract under § 2-207(2)).
49. See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1167 (6th Cir.

1972) (defining additional as term not discussed in offer). But see National
Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Peninsular Equip. Corp., 106 Misc. 2d 458, 431 N.Y.S.2d
948 (1980) (a term mentioned in acceptance may conflict with term implied
in the offer by other provisions of local commercial laws).
50. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98
Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977). In Southern Idaho, the acceptance of the
offer changed the delivery date specifically set forth in the offer. The court
concluded that this term was not additional; it contradicted the delivery
term of the offer and could not be included. Id. at 505, 567 P.2d at 1253.
51. See Davenport, supra note 2, at 79-80.
52. Advocates of the strict approach to § 2-207 differ as to the effect of
different terms on the offer. See J. W=rrE &R. SUmmERs, supra note 1, § 1-2,
at 27-30. Summers believes that a different term would be ejected from the
acceptance. See American Parts Co. v. American Arbit. Ass'n, 8 Mich. App.
156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967). White, however, believes that comment 6 dictates
that terms which conflict, or are different, cancel each other out. See Idaho
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would prevent a definite expression of agreement. 53
The other favored approach takes a practical view of section
2-207's language, 54 and recognizes no practical distinction between a different term and an additional one. 55 Advocates of
this approach rely on the language of comment 3 to section 2-207
for support. Comment 3 refers to both different and additional
terms under section 2-207(2).56 A term may be additional to the
offer because it was not expressed in the offer, but it may conflict with terms implied in the offer by other sections of the local
commercial laws.5 7 The practical view is that any extra term
should be subjected to section 2-207(2) to decide if it should be
58
included in the contract.
Historically, Illinois courts, presented with the question of
different versus additional terms under section 2-207(2), have
held implicitly that no distinction should be made between the
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979); Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe &Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567
P.2d 1246 (1977).
53. Duval &Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975). The sellers
in Duval gave the buyers a written offer for an output contract which specified no amount. Buyers accepted the offer, but added an estimate of the

goods to be delivered. The sellers protested the addition and insisted that
no contract had been formed. The court concluded that § 2-207 could not be
applied to include the "added" terms in the contract; no definite and seasonable expression of acceptance existed where a reply included a conflicting provision. Id. at 786, 214 S.E.2d at 358.
54. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141
Cal. Rptr. 157 (1977); Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981). In Boese-Hilburn, the court reviewed both approaches
to the problem of "different terms." Citing Steiner as a well-reasoned point

of view, the court reviewed the three conclusions that Steiner reached.
First, if a term conflicts, it will be a material alteration and will be excluded
under § 2-207(2) (b). Second, the distinction between additional and differ-

ent is ambiguous because any additional term in an acceptance which adds
to an offer arguably makes that offer look different from the way it looked
prior to the addition. This logic shows how ambiguous the distinction really
is. Third, the offeror will retain control of his offer under § 2-207(2) (a).
Boese-Hilburn, 616 S.W.2d at 527.

55. See Duesenberg, supra note 2, at 1249 (best interpretation of § 2-207
is that if term is different, it is implicitly objected to and will not become
part of the contract under § 2-207(2) (c)). See also Murray, supra note 2, at
327-28 (probable intention of Code's drafters was to cover both additional
and different terms in § 2-207(2)).
56. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
57. See Air Products & Chem. Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d
193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973) (disclaimer for any consequential loss in the acknowledgment conflicted with implied terms in the offer and could not be
included in the contract because the offeror objected to it).
58. See Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal.
WRtr 157 (1977). See also Willamette-Western Corp. v. Lowry, 279 Or. 525,
P.2d 1339 (1977) (even if § 2-207(2) applied to different terms as well as
additional terms, term in question would still be excluded because it materially altered agreement).
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two when determining whether an extra term would become
part of the contract. The cases usually involved an acceptance
which contained terms that conflicted with or contradicted the
terms in the offer.5 9 While the courts referred to the distinction
between the words different and additional, they did not explain
why the distinction was made. Each court also found it unnecessary to adopt either the strict approach or the practical approach to the discrepancies in section 2-207 because each case
0
could be decided under subsections 1 or 3 of section 2-207.6
Illinois courts have thus been hesitant to commit themselves to either the strict or practical approach. 61 By following
this trend,62 the Clifford-Jacobs court fulfilled its appellate function by remaining consistent with previous decisions. 63 After
concluding that a contract was formed by the exchange of
forms,6 the court had an ideal opportunity to clarify the effect of
"different terms" under section 2-207(2).65 Instead, the court
59. See Gord Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Mfg., Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d
380, 381-82, 431 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1982) (while buyer sent two purchase orders
limiting seller's acceptance to terms in purchase orders, seller's acknowledgement form included term not mentioned in purchase orders); McCarty
v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 89 I. App. 3d 498, 499-504, 411 N.E.2d 936, 938-42
(1980) (offer to sell machine placed responsibility for obtaining safety
equipment for the machine on buyer, while buyer's acceptance required
seller to provide all necessary safety equipment); Album Graphics, Inc. v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 339-45, 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1044-49 (1980)
(buyer's offer was made with assumption that all expressed and implied
warranties would be included, while seller's acceptance included disclaimer
of warranty and limitation on liability); Tecumseh Int'l Corp. v. City of
Springfield, 70 Ill. App. 3d 101, 101-02, 388 N.E.2d 460, 461-62 (1979) (offer to
sell coal placed risk of loss on buyer while buyer's acceptance placed risk of
loss on seller); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter., 39 Ill. App. 3d
48, 48-52, 349 N.E.2d 627, 630-32 (1976) (offer to sell disclaimed all warranties,
while acceptance required all warranties to be included); Nitrin, Inc. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 596, 596-600, 342 N.E.2d 79, 80-84 (1976)
(offer to purchase contained guarantees for materials and workmanship,
while acceptance limited seller's liability to replacement of non-conforming
parts).
60. See supra cases cited at note 59.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
62. Id. The trend could be considered to be one of avoiding any clarification of the ambiguities between §§ 2-207(1) and (2).
63. See Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U.L REV. 1 (1950)
(a function of the appellate court is to uniformly administer justice
throughout the state).
64. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App.
3d 29, 31-32, 437 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1982). The textbook formula for a § 2-207 problem is to set forth the purpose of § 2-207 and then discover if the reply to the
offer was a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance. The reply will
not operate as an acceptance if it lacked this definite and seasonable expression or if it was expressly made conditional on the offeror's assent to it.
& R. SuMMERs, supra note 1, § 1-2, at 24-39.
See J. WI
65. Clifford Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App.
3d 29, 30-32, 437 N.E.2d 22, 22-24 (1982). Unlike the previous Illinois deci-
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demonstrated an acrobatic ability to walk a fence while standing
on both sides by choosing to incorporate implicitly both approaches in its interpretation of section 2-207(2).
The Clifford-Jacobs court followed the strict approach when
it addressed the status of the price-adjustment provision. 66 The
court reasoned that, before a provision can be scrutinized under
section 2-207(2), it must not be different from any provision in
the offer 67 a different term would be excluded from the contract.68 Simultaneously, the court used the practical approach.
The court used the same language to define both "different"
term and "materially altering" term. 69 By finding no distinguishing definition, the court implied that a different term materially alters the offer and should be excluded. It also implied
that a materially-altering term is different from the offer and
70
also should be excluded.
Clifford-Jacobs began as an authoritative expression of the
operation of section 2-207. The court eventually stumbled into a
confusing analysis of the effect of the price-adjustment provision on the contract. While the court identified, with its language, a distinction between different and additional terms, its
definitions indicate that no distinction exists between different
and additional terms. Consequently, the holding is clear while
the reasons for the decision are not.
The court should have followed only one approach in reaching its conclusion. It could have followed the strict approach,
relying on the duty not to add or subtract words from the language of a statute, 71 but the court then would have had to define
the distinction between different and additional terms. CliffordJacobs, like other previous Illinois decisions, concluded that the
term was additional apparently to avoid the task of defining this
72
distinction.
Conversely, the court could have followed the practical approach by relying on the policy of commercial law to construe
sions, the court could not rely on § 2-207(1) or (3) to reach a decision, but
had to rely on § 2-207(2).
66. Id. at 30-31, 437 N.E.2d at 24.
67. Id. at 31, 437 N.E.2d at 24.
68. Id. at 32, 437 N.E.2d at 25.
69. Id. at 31-33, 437 N.E.2d at 24-25.
70. Id. at 32, 437 N.E.2d at 25.
71. See Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REv. 211
(1968) (courts should not use creative interpretations in applying a fully
integrated and comprehensive regulation or statutory command).
72. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g &Mfg. Co., 107 Ill. App.
3d 29, 31-33, 437 N.E.2d 22, 23-25 (1982).

1983]

Clifford-Jacobs Forging v. Capital Eng. & Mfg.

liberally the meaning of section 2-207. 73 The court then would
have had to state expressly that no distinction existed between
different and additional terms; section 2-207(2) would dictate the
fate of the extra term. 74 The Clifford-Jacobs court implicitly recognized this approach when it used the same concept to define
different as well as materially-altering terms.
The value of Clifford-Jacobs can be questioned because of
the lack of definitional clarity expressed in reaching its conclusions. The court uses both the strict and the practical approaches without identifying the authority upon which it relied.
7
The opinion should have been a thoughtful review of the facts,
an authoritative expression of the law relating to those facts, 76
and a clear statement of the legal rules, standards, principles,
and policies which the court used to preserve predictability in
the law. 77 Clifford-Jacobs, however, is not a thoughtful review of
the law. It does not include an analysis of the law leading to its
conclusions, and therefore cannot add to the predictability of
the law. It is quite possible that the judges believed that the
inconsistencies and ambiguities are a problem the legislature
should clarify, 78 but if that is true the court should have so
79
stated.
73. 'This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-102 (1981). See
also Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395

(1950) ("father" of Uniform Commercial Code talks about simple construction and liberal interpretation).
74. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-207, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE comment
3 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
75. See Tate, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 SOUTHERN U. L. REV.
250 (1975) (justice function should not involve judicial impressionism, but

should be an authoritative review of facts and law).
76. Id.
77. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976) (appellate courts should announce, clarify, and harmonize
the rules of decision employed by the legal system).
78. It should be noted that two state legislatures saw fit to insert the

phrase "different terms" into subsection 2 of their statutes comparable to
§ 2-207. Both statutes' comments reflect the practical approach that no distinction should be made between "additional" and "different." IOWA CODE
ANN. § 554.2207 (West 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN., § 402.207 (West 1981). Ironically, both legislatures have since deleted the phrase "different terms" from
subsection 2 without any comment, Iowa in 1974 and Wisconsin in 1969.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2207 (West Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.207
(West Supp. 1982).
79. See generally Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State
Appellate Courts, 24 U. CI. L. REV. 211, 219 (1957) ('"The responsibility to
keep the law straight is a high one ....
[Courts] should not be misled by
the cliche that policy is a matter for the legislature and not the courts.

There is always an area not covered by legislation. ..

").
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Section 2-207 was designed to solve the contract problems
encountered with standard-form contracting. Because of the inconsistencies in its language, section 2-207 has yet to fulfill its
supporters' expectations. The Clifford-Jacobs court could have
clarified the mechanics of section 2-207 under Illinois law, but,
by failing to set forth a clear decision, the court did not achieve
that goal. Because the Illinois Supreme Court has denied certiorari in this case, it appears that Illinois' section 2-207 is condemned to a future of inconsistent application until some court
decides to confront the inconsistencies within the section and
resolve them through an authoritative analysis.
Kurt E. Olsen

